A walkthrough of the official Utah Valley University After-Action Report on a 3D map of the campus. Every fact on this page is drawn from the University's own 158-page report or from its released records. No speculation, no theories.
Source: UVU After-Action Report · 158 pp · Lake Forest Group + Brownstein Hyatt · plus the Chief Long GRAMA release, 112 pp
Several elevated vantage points overlooked Charlie Kirk's speaking spot in the Fountain Courtyard. The day's security attention went to the Hall of Flags walkway, the elevated deck beside and above the stage. The shot came from the roof of the Losee Center, across the courtyard to the northeast. This is Google's 3D capture of the real campus, with positions marked from the report's own map.
At 12:23 p.m. a single shot was fired. At 12:41 an officer began inspecting the Losee Center roof. This is every event the report and the Chief's released records put on the clock that day. Every entry names its page.
From the first request to the day before. The amber markers are the report's own flagged Key Decision Points. The blue markers come from Chief Long's released records and are not in the report.
The report prints two text exchanges between TPUSA's security supervisor and UVU's police chief. Both are shown here exactly as printed.
On September 8, TPUSA security supervisor Dan Flood forwarded Chief Long a warning from the student group: "there is student roof access pretty close to where CK will be set up." He asked for controlled access, or to put one of his own people up there.
Chief Long's answer: "I got you covered." UVUPD then cleared and taped off the Hall of Flags walkway and assigned two officers to it.
The report contradicts itself on this exchange. Its timeline table dates it 4:11 p.m. and quotes "We got you covered." Its verbatim transcript says 3:12 p.m. and "I got you covered."
The report's finding is that the wider venue, ringed by buildings and elevated vantage points, never got a documented line-of-sight assessment. The shot came from the roof of the Losee Center.
Source: After-Action Report, verbatim exchange p.42; timeline p.18; Section 3.4 p.63. Flood did not respond to the reviewers' calls, emails or certified letter (p.41, fn.23).
At 9:04 a.m. on September 10 the two men texted again. The concern on both sides was people on the walkway above the tent, and objects being thrown from it.
Flood reports that a person on the walkway "asked the Dean's office if they can stand above us and they said yes, you can." Chief Long says his event officers arrive at 11:00.
Long proposes meeting on the walkway at 11. The report says that face-to-face meeting did not occur.
“The absence of a formal pre-event briefing and coordinated walk-through with Brian Harpole, Dan Flood, and the TPUSA security team was a critical missed opportunity.”After-Action Report, p.43
Source: After-Action Report, verbatim excerpt p.43. Bracketed lines are the report's own descriptions of photos in the exchange.
UVU released 112 pages of communications from Chief Long's account under Utah's public records law. They show two contacts on September 9, the day before the event. The After-Action Report mentions neither. The pages are shown here as released, with UVU's redactions.
These are in the 158 pages, mostly away from the executive summary and the timeline. Every quote is verbatim; every link opens that page of the report. Our own reading is marked as inference.
The release is mostly staff chats from the days after the shooting. These items do not appear in the After-Action Report.
The report opens by stating no UVU employee acted "in bad faith or in willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others." It then lays out ten key findings, shown here with the report's exact headings and sentences. Tap any finding to expand.
After 12:23 p.m. the report lists six campus alerts by time, then “six additional Rave Alerts and website updates,” then a final all-clear at 5:45. Several contradicted each other: “suspect in custody” (there was none), “leave campus immediately,” then “secure in place,” then a message that went out with the template placeholder still in it.
The report's final section lists its recommendations, each tagged with a status reported by UVU. Recommendation 2.3 speaks directly to September 10: set criteria for moving events indoors over line-of-sight concerns and high-ground vulnerabilities.
The report lists the actions UVU took after September 10. Each one also shows what was not in place on the day.
Other coverage has focused on how the event was booked and who stayed silent. These documented details in the report have had far less attention.
Post a correction, a page we should look at, a location for the map, or a records request worth filing. Write it here and it opens on X as a post tagging @afnptorg. We read every one and check it against the documents before anything goes on this page.
The entire 158-page After-Action Report is hosted here, unedited. Everything on this page cites back to it.